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XII/2

Recent Developments
Vulgarity vs. Vemaculh
In Diehl v. State, 294 Md. 466, 451
A.2d 115 (1982), the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that loudly
uttering "Fuck you," in response to
an unlawful order by a police officer
does not constitute disorderly conduct in violation of Maryland Code
art. 27, §121 (1976 Repl. Vol.) nor is
it an unprotected exercise of freedom of speech (i.e. expression of
obscenity or "fighting words"). The
court also reversed Diehl's conviction for resisting arrest on the basis
that the officer had no legal justification for the arrest.
Robert Diehl was a passenger in
a car and got out of that car after it
had been stopped by the police for
a traffic violation. Officer Gavin, the
arresting officer in this case, ordered Diehl back in the car. Diehl
refused, loudly asserting his right
to remain outside the car-"Fuck
you, Gavin," "I know my rights."
In reviewing the lower court's decision, Judge Cole supported the
policy of avoiding regulation of
speech where the words do not constitutionally infringe on the rights
of others.

Non-Speech Regulation of
Verbal Behavior
The court noted that Diehl's utterance did not constitute disorderly conduct as a non-speech regulation of verbal behavior because
his words did not violate either of
two proscriptions of the statute:
(1)"willfully disturb[ing] any
neighborhood . .. by loud and
unseemly noises" and
(2)"profanely curs[ing] and
swear[ing] or us[ing] obscene
language" at a place within the
hearing of persons passing by.
Maryland Ann. Code art. 27 §121
(1976 Repl. Vol.)
With regard to the first proscription, Diehl's choice of words were
held to be used to emphasize rather
than to offend or willfully disturb

anyone. Diehl's words were directed only at Police Officer Gavin.
"[Hie was not trying to disturb
others or exhort them to breach the
peace," Diehl, 294 Md. at 471, 451
A.2d at 118, even though a subsequent "fracas" between another individual and another police officer
at the scene ensued. Although
Diehl's words and conflict with Officer Gavin drew a crowd, there was
"no evidence showing any of the
observers was [sic] disturbed." Id.
at 472, 451 A.2d at 119.
With regard to the second proscription the court adopted the Supreme Court of Rhode Island's
standard for defining profanity:
"importing an imprecation of divine
vengeance or implying divine condemnation or irreverance toward
God or holy things." State v. Authelet, 385 A.2d 642 at 644 (R.I. 1978).
Although arguably distasteful,
Diehl's words do not fall within this
standard, and thus, he was found
not to have violated the profanity
aspect of the statute. The obscenity
aspect of the second proscription was
left to be addressed in the verbal
regulation section of the opinion.
Judge Rodowsky, joined by Judge
Murphy and Judge Smith, dissented only to the reversal of the
trial court's guilty verdict for the
charge of resisting arrest. There was
significant contradiction between the
testimony of Diehl and Gavin with
regard to the facts of the incident.
The dissent was of the opinion that
there was testimony sufficient for
the jury to find probable cause for
arrest. "Officer Gavin, while being
vulgarly abused by a person whose
yelling and screaming was drawing
a crowd, was ... entitled to rely on
the terms of the statute and on the
case law statements of what traditionally has constituted disorderly
conduct." Diehl, 294 Md. at 485, 451
A.2d at 125. In determining whether
the lawfulness of Gavin's order was
dispositive of probable cause to arrest for disorderly conduct, the dis-

sent contended that the court should
have followed the test for lawfulness adopted in Drews v. State, 224
Md. 186, 167 A.2d 341 (1961), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
378 U.S. 547 (1964) stated as: "the
refusal to obey an order (to move
on) of a police officer ' "can be justified only where the circumstances
show conclusively that the police
officer's direction was purely arbitrary and was not calculated in any
way to promote the public or(citations omitted) Diehl,
der.'....
294 Md. at 486, 451 A.2d at 126.
The majority opinion establishes
that one who is acting lawfully has
the right to strongly assert the lawfulness of one's actions and to assert one's rights as a law-abiding
person to the extent of using some
expletives to emphasize the expression and to resist unlawful arrest
with minor physical force and with
continued use of those expletives.

Speech Regulation
"Diehl's oral communication in
this situation clearly constituted
speech," Id. at 471, 451 A.2d at 118,
because it was held to be a part of
an attempt to convey a message expressing his outrage with the unlawful police conduct.
The court used the test for obscenity established in Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957): that the
expression must be erotic. Again,
although the expletive was arguably
distasteful, Diehl was not in violation of the statute because his utterance did not "[tend] to excite sexual desire." Diehl, 294 Md. at 474,
451 A. 2d at 120.
Diehl was also found not guilty
of using "fighting words" intended
to incite Officer Gavin to breach the
peace. Citing Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1962), the
Diehl court stated that "[sluch words
are not constitutionally protected
because their 'slight social value as
a step to truth ... is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.' " (citation omitted) Diehl, 294 Md. at 474, 451 A.2d
at 120. The court recognized that in
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
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(1971),"the Supreme Court shifted
the emphasis from the words themselves to the context in which they
were uttered and thereby limited the
doctrine as announced in Chaplinsky." Diehl, 294 Md. at 475, 451 A.2d
at 120.
In Cohen, the Supreme Court refused to classify the expression "Fuck
the Draft" lettered on the back of a
jacket worn in a courthouse as
"fighting words" because they were
not directed to the person of the
hearer nor intentionally provoked a
given group to hostile action. The
Court of Appeals of Maryland applied this narrowed application of
the "fighting words" doctrine in
Downs v. State, 278 Md. 610, 366 A.2d
41 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974
(1977). The court in Diehl adopted
the Downs holding stating that "even
though the views expressed might
be offensive to someone who overheard them, they were not directed to such persons and, as a result, were not under the rubric of
fighting words." Diehl, 294 Md. at
476-77, 451 A.2d at 121. However,
Diehl's words were directed toward
someone, specifically, Officer Gavin.
The court opted not to address the
question whether a different and
higher standard applies when the
addressee is a police officer.
The court found direction from
Downs, which "teaches us that the
use of the word 'fuck' is not punishable in the absence of compelling
reason." Id. at 477, 451 A.2d at 122.
No such compelling reason was
found in this case. The court held
that Diehl had a right to verbally
protest the unlawful exercise of police authority, and the utterance in
question "though distasteful, forcefully conveyed the intensity of his
objection." Id. at 478-79, 451 A.2d
at 122. Diehl's words were held to
be no more than an emotional and
emphatic response to Gavin's order. "In such moments, one man's
vulgarity may well be another's vernacular." Id. at 479, 451 A.2d at 122.

State v.

Randall Book Corp.
In State v. Randall Book Corp., Md. App. _ ,452 A.2d 187 (1982),
the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland reviewed the dismissal of
charges against the Randall Book
Corporation, where the trial court
found Article 27, §416D of the Annotated Code of Maryland to be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Section 416D is basically an
obscenity statute, although the
Maryland Legislature deleted the
word "obscene" (primarily due to
the confusion in the law on obscenity handed down by the United
States Supreme Court). Section 416D,
in essence, states that "advertising
the human body depicting sadomasochistic abuse, sexual conduct
or sexual excitement" is a crime. See
Randall Book Corp., Md. App. at
, 452 A.2d at 188.
The appellate court in Randall Book
Corp. noted the recent court of appeals' opinion in Blaine Wilson Smiley v. State, Md. -, 450 A.2d
909 (1982) and found that case to be
determinative of the constitutional
issue before them. In Smiley, the
court held that Section 416D was
enacted to broadly prohibit advertising which depicted obscenity, enabling the court to apply the standards enuciated in Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973).The court in Smiley found that:
[w]hen the Miller standards are
embodied in section 416D, it
becomes patent that the statute
is not overbroad and vague. By
requiring compliance with the
Miller standards, "a person of
ordinary intelligence [is given]
fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by
the statute," and the statute is
not "so indefinite that 'it encourages arbitrary and erratic
arrests and convictions.' "
Smiley, Md. at -, 450 A.2d at
912, citing Colautti v. Franklin, 439
U.S. 379 (1979).
The primary issue-the constitutional question-raised in Randall

Book Corp. was answered fully by
the decision in Smiley, and the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals
reversed the trial court's decision and
remanded the case against Randall
for further proceedings.

Miller v. State
In Miller v. State, Md. App.
-,
A.2d
(1982), Miller
was indicted on charges of robbery
with a deadly weapon, kidnapping,
rape and various other sex offenses.
The charges arose out of an incident
that occurred on October 28, 1980.
On June 16, 1981 Miller's trial began
and he was convicted by June 19,
1981. On appeal, the appellant raised
issues based on lack of trial by impartial jury, lack of speedy trial and
based on error in permitting a State
witness to testify despite non-disclosure of the witness' name during
the discovery process.
The appellate court addressed the
speedy trial issue first, examining in
detail the circumstances surrounding the appellant's arrest and trial
in relation to Maryland Rule 746.
Rule 746 provides in part that:
a trial date shall be set which
shall be not later than 180 days
after the appearance or waiver
of counsel or after the appearance of defendant before the
court pursuant to Rule 723
(hereinafter referred to as the
"180 day rule").
Counsel for the appellant first entered his appearance on December
11, 1980 and pre-trial motions were
heard on June 9, 1981. The appellant contended that June 9, 1981
constituted the 181st day after appearance of counsel. The court corrected this miscalculation, citing
Maryland Rule 8 which in essence
requires that the day which triggers
the time period is not to be included
in the calculation.
Upon further examination of the
speedy trial issue, the court found
the case of State v. Lattisaw, 48 Md.
App. 20, 425 A.2d 1051 (1981) to be
controlling. As a result of this case,
the court held the appellant had

